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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HERBERT BURTON and FLORENCE 
BURTON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
ALAN H. COOMBS, CARLA H. 
COOMBS, his wife, FOUR 
SEASONS MOTOR INN, INC., a 
Utah Corporation and FOUR 
SEASONS MOTOR INN II, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 14245 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL 
*** 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiffs to recover damages for 
the breach of a management contract relating to the operation 
and management of a motel in St. George, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a trial before the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, 
sitting without a jury, the court found that defendant Four 
Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., had breached its contract with the 
plaintiff respondents and awarded a money judgment covering 
.i _ 
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the period of time from the date of breach to the date of 
judgment, together with attorney's fees and interest. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the factual determinations 
of the lower court affirmed. However, respondents have 
filed a cross-appeal claiming that the lower court erred in 
failing to find that defendants were bound by a partial 
settlement offer accepted by the plaintiffs in open court, 
and further erred in applying an improper measure of damages. 
Respondents therefore seek to have the judgment modified in 
these particulars. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants statement of facts is not entirely accur-
ate. It assumes numerous factual matters which were in dis-
pute and which were contrary to the weight of the evidence 
and the findings of the court. It omits several material 
facts, it refers to bits of testimony out of context, and it 
is filled with statements and conclusions not supported by 
the evidence. For this reason the respondents desire to make 
their own statement of facts that are relevant and material 
to the issues in this appeal. 
Defendant and appellant Alan H. Coombs (hereinafter 
referred to as Coombs) was the promoter of a corporation and 
a forty-unit motel in St. George, Utah known as Four Seasons 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Motor Inn. Coombs, an attorney at law, was also the builder 
of the motel (TC-3)1. In the early part of 1972 Coombs was 
looking for an investor-manager and became acquainted with 
the plaintiffs and respondents, Herbert and Florence Burton 
(hereinafter referred to as Burtons) through a real estate 
agent (T-5,TC-3). At that time Mr. Burton worked for a 
hardware company in Salt Lake City, and the Burtons had been 
looking for an investment in a motel (T-5), although they had 
never had any prior experience in any motel operation (T-62). 
The initial contact was followed by various negotiations be-
tween the parties, the execution of a preliminary agreement 
(T-6), and eventually the execution of a Stock Purchase Agree-
ment and Management Agreement (T-8, Exhibits P-2,P-3). The 
terms of the agreement between Burtons and Coombs called for 
investment by the Burtons of $80,000.00. Burtons sold their 
home in Salt Lake City and liquidated their savings and stocks 
and bonds and made this investment (T-13). For the $80,000.00 
investment the Burtons received 1) a management contract for 
the operation of the forty unit motel2, 2) 20% of the stock of 
the corporation and, 3) the right to be represented on the 
-3-
1. The record contains two transcripts, one for defendant Cootibs and the 
other for all other witnesses. References to the Cocmbs transcript will 
be designated at TC. 
2. The management contract was the most important part of the consideration. 
It was a 30 year contract and provided that the managers would receive 
10% of the gross revenue from the operation of the motel. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain err rs.
Board of Directors of the corporation (Exhibits P-2,P-3). 
The remaining 80% of the stock in Four Seasons Motor Inn, 
Inc. was issued to Coombs and his wife, Carla H. Coombs (TC-8). 
The only consideration given by Coombs for his stock was his 
promoting services in finding the land, and arranging for 
financing and construction of the motel (TC-9-12). At the 
time Burtons made their investment the motel was still under 
construction and was approximately 50-70 percent complete 
(T-14). The Burtons moved to St. George on April 10, 1972 
and the motel opened for business on May 6, 1972 (T-15). 
Burtons managed the motel from May 6, 1972 until approximately 
April 30, 1973 (T-16). During the time that Burtons managed 
the motel it was acknowledged by Coombs that Burtons were 
good managers and did an excellent job (TC-14). 
Problems between Burtons and Coombs began to develop 
when Coombs began to promote a second motel complex (an eighty 
unit motel and convention center) across the street from the 
Four Seasons Motor Inn (TC-14). The written agreement be-
tween Burtons and Coombs (Exhibit P-2) had anticipated the 
eventual construction of a second motel and had given the 
Burtons an option to purchase an equivalent interest. However, 
Coombs had told the Burtons that he did not expect to build 
the second motel for a period of at least five years (T-21,64,80). 
-4-
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Coombs advised Burtons in approximately July of 1972 that he 
was going ahead with the second motel (T-21). The Burtons 
objected because they felt it was premature in that the 
first motel had not yet had time to become established 
(T-21). Coombs advised them that he was going ahead anyway 
(T-21). He told the Burtons/ however, not to worry and that 
he would give them a management contract for the new motel 
to be built across the street (T-21,23). Coombs proceeded 
with his plans for the second motel and organized another 
corporation which he named Four Seasons Motor Inn II, Inc. 
The Burtons did not invest in the second motel and an inter-
est was sold to another investor, Derrill Larkin. 
During the time the second motel was under construc-
tion Burtons began to worry about their position (T-23). 
In a number of conversations Coombs told Mrs. Burton "just 
donf t worry about it you are going to be the managers, you 
are going to be protected, I have always dealt fairly with 
you and just don't worry" (T-23). Burtons on numerous occa-
sions, expressed their concern and apprehension not only to 
Coombs, but to Derrill Larkin (T-172). Burtons didn't like 
the situation, but continued to work along with Coombs hoping 
that everything would eventually be worked out. 
As the second motel neared completion, Burtons became 
more and more concerned about their management contract. They 
-5-
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tried to formulate a contract on various occasions but could 
not come to any definite proposal on the terms. In a meet-
ing held on approximately September 30, 1972, the Burtons 
were offered a proposal which was unacceptable (T-24,66). 
At that meeting Coombs offered to replace their 10% manage-
ment contract with a 3% contract which the Burtons considered 
to be grossly unfair (T-24,66). The meeting ended on a 
friendly note and Coombs continued to assure Burtons that 
this was merely a preliminary offer and that eventually some-
thing satisfactory could be worked out (T-25,66). In approx-
imately February of 1973 Coombs reduced another proposal to 
writing and presented it to the Burtons (T-25,69; Exhibit P-5). 
This proposal had several objectionable terms, the most un-
acceptable being that Coombs was offering the Burtons a one year 
contract on the combined motel operation to replace their 
existing 30 year management contract (T-27,68). When the 
written proposal was rejected Coombs told the Burtons emphat-
ically that they were never going to get anything more than 
a one year contract and repeated that to them many times up 
until April 30, 1972 (T-27). On another occasion Coombs told 
Mr. Burton that he would never get more than a one year con-
tract; that he was an attorney and at times people sued him; 
but that he always turned the matters over to his counsel and 
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would never hear anything more about it (T-69) . 
The second motel opened in April of 1973 (T-27). 
At the time of the opening the Burtons were still hoping 
to work something out and assisted for two weeks in get-
ting the second motel opened and going (T-28,29). Frus-
trations were continuing to build and on approximately 
April 25f 1973/ the Burtons demanded a showdown to get 
something resolved (T-28)• The parties met and Coombs 
asked "what is it going to take to make you happy", to 
which Mrs, Burton replied "permanency"/ pointing out that 
they had bought a thirty year contract with all their 
savings to assure themselves an income for life and that 
they weren't going to give it up (T-29). Again the response 
from Coomb was "a one year contract and that is it" (T-29). 
Another meeting was held on April 29/ 1973/ in which Coombs 
made another unreasonable take it or leave it offer and 
then told them in the meeting that he would make their 
stock worthless, their management contract had no value, 
and that they were merely employees of his and he didn't 
want them to operate the place anymore, and that they were 
through (T-30/72/103). By this time the two motels had 
been constructed to appear to the public as one motel under 
the same management; the office had been closed on the 
-7-
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Burtons1 side of the street and moved to the new motel; 
the telephone system had been taken out of the first motel; 
the cash registers and office equipment had been moved 
across the street; a new office sign had been installed; 
and a neon sign on the old building was installed desig-
nating that the office was across the street (T-104). The 
next day when Mrs. Burton attempted to go to work in the 
new offices she was ordered off the premises by Coombs 
(T-31). 
Based upon the above facts the trial judge con-
cluded in his findings of fact and conclusions of law that 
Coombs, in acting for the defendant corporation Four Seasons 
Motor Inn, Inc., had breached its management contract with 
the Burtons by making it effectively impossible for them to 
continue to perform under their management agreement (R-285). 
The court further found that there had been considerable 
negotiating back and forth over a new management agreement; 
that no new agreement was ever reached; that the original 
management agreement was still in full force and effect; 
and that Burtons had never done anything to breach the orig-
inal contract (R-282). The court also found that after the 
breach had taken place any subsequent offers of re-employment 
were conditional upon Burtons operating the motel under a 
-8-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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new and unsatisfactory agreement and that they were jus-
tified in refusing to do so (R-284,311). 
As a part of this case Burtons also filed other 
claims and causes of action against defendant Coombs and 
defendant Four Seasons Motor Inn II, Inc. in the nature 
of derivative relief seeking damages for mismanagement of 
the corporation, co-mingling of assets, improper use of the 
corporate name by Four Seasons Motor Inn II, Inc., improper 
withdrawals of capital from the corporation, the issuance 
of watered stock, and the making of secret profits (R-1,21). 
These issues were severed at the pre-trial and it was ordered 
that they be tried in a separate action (R-140). Thus, the 
only issues on appeal in the present action relate to the 
breach, or lack of breach, of the management contract and 
the consequences of said breach. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT APPELLANTS 
BREACHED THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT. 
After a very lengthy trial in this case the trial 
court made findings that the appellants breached the manage-
ment contract with the Burtons, and that the Burtons had 
never done anything to breach their agreement. The entire 
-9-
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issue as to who breached the contract is a factual issue, 
and there was a sharp conflict in the testimony on many 
critical points. Appellants have attempted to convince 
the reviewing court that the lower court committed error 
by stating and arguing their version of the facts. How-
ever, on appeal the respondents are entitled to have the 
court consider all of the evidence, and every inference 
and intendment fairly arising therefrom, in the light most 
favorable to them^ Toomers Estate vs. Union Pacific Rail-
road Company, 121 Utah 37, 239 P.2d 163. The reviewing 
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court and is not concerned with a preponderance of the 
evidence but only with the question of whether there is 
substantial evidence to sustain the judgment. Leon Glazier 
and Sons, Inc. vs. Larson, 26 Utah 2d 429, 491 P.2d 226. 
On appeal, the evidence in favor of the respondent must be 
considered to the exclusion of contrary evidence. Hoggan & 
Hall & Higgins, Inc. vs. Hall, 18 Utah 2d 3, 414 P.2d 89. 
The court is further obliged to consider uncontradicted 
evidence in composite with all of the other evidence. Super 
Tire Market vs. Rollins', 18 Utah 2d 122, 412 P.2d 132./ 
In light of the above fundamental and basic rules 
of appellant review, the evidence supporting the findings 
and judgment of the lower court may be summarized as follows: 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is undisputed that the Burtons didf in fact, 
have a management contract. The terms of the contract 
were not in dispute. It was a thirty year contract and 
provided for compensation at the rate of 10% of the gross 
revenue of the operation. It was purchased by the Burtons, 
together with a minority stock interest of doubtful value, 
for the sum of $80,000.00. It is further undisputed that 
the Burtons operated under the contract for a period of 
almost one year and that they did an excellent job as man-
agers. From this point the evidence began to get conflicting 
as to the circumstances of the Burtons1 termination. 
If the trial court believed the testimony of the 
Burtons it appears clearly that there was a great deal of 
concern, apprehension, disagreement and unhappiness about 
the building of the second motel. These concerns were ex-
pressed on numerous occasions and they had been given assur-
ances upon assurances that a satisfactory arrangement would 
be worked out. Up until the actual opening of the second 
motel the parties were still on friendly and amicable terms. 
It was only after the second motel was actually 
opened that the Burtons came to realize that a satisfactory 
offer for the management of the combined operation was not 
going to be extended. Among other things, the Burtons were 
-11-
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simply not willing to give up a thirty year contract for 
which they invested their life savings of $80,000.00 for 
a one year contract on the combined operation. There was 
a conflict in the testimony as to conversations to the 
effect that the one year was to be a trial period, after 
which the parties could revert back to the old contract -
the Burtons strongly denied the existence of such conversa-
tions (T-68), while Coombs testified that such was discussed. 
The fact is, however, that the proposed agreement prepared 
by Coombs (Exhibit P-5) which Coombs requested the Burtons 
to sign and which he claimed at trial embodied the terms of 
a modified oral agreement, clearly provided for a one year 
term. It purports to be an "addendum" to the original 
management contract. It provides at paragraph 2 on page 1 
that "the management agreement entered into by both parties 
on February 15, 1973, shall be incorporated into this agree-
ment and shall apply to the operation of both units with the 
following exceptions". Then listed under the exceptions is 
the provision at paragraph 7 stating that, "this agreement 
shall continue for a period of one (1) year with the intent 
that it shall continue thereafter if the management proves 
to be satisfactory to all persons". Nowhere in this pro-
posed contract does it say that the parties will revert 
-12-
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back to the old contract after a one (1) year trial per-
iod. Had the Burtons ever signed such an agreement, the 
above provisions would clearly modify the original manage-
ment contract as to its terms. The Burtons, further, would 
have been forever precluded under the Parol Evidence Rule 
to claim that the parties had some oral agreement different 
from what was reduced to writing. The affirmative testimony 
of the Burtons was also to the effect that they were told 
not once but on many occasions when the negotiations started 
to break down that all they would ever get was a one (1) 
year contract, that he (Coombs) was eighty percent and they 
were twenty percent so that he could fire them at will, 
and that their management contract had no value. And so, 
when the final showdown came and the Burtons refused to 
accept the terms that were being forced upon them, Coombs 
told the Burtons they were both through and later ordered 
Mrs. Burton off the premises. Coombs' contentions that 
he then offered to sever the combined operation and rein-
state Burtons to the management of the forty unit motel are 
flatly denied by the Burtons. 
It is further clear from the evidence in this case 
that at the time the Burtons were fired by Coombs, the 
-13-
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physical circumstances were such that it would have been 
impossible for them to have continued their contract. By 
that time, the office had been moved across the street. 
All of the telephone equipment and office equipment had 
been moved, signs had been changed and installed designat-
ing that the office was across the street. 
There was some testimony that after the blow up, 
Coombs asked Mr. Burton to come over across the street and 
work in the combined operation. Certainly Mr. Burton had 
no obligation to go over and work without a contract in an 
operation in which he had no ownership interest. Further, 
had he done so, the defendants would have claimed his work-
ing to be an acknowledgment of the existence of some new 
oral contract—which is the very position that they took 
throughout the whole case in attempting to imply a new con-
tract from the two weeks help that the Burtons extended when 
the second motel was opened. The court might note on pages 
3 and 5 of the Pre-Trial Order (R-142) that up until the time 
of trial defendants1 position has always been that the man-
agement contract was modified, and that plaintiffs' breached 
the modified agreement. On page 5 of the Pre-Trial Order 
defendants specifically claim that the conduct of the parties 
-14-
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was a basis for establishing the modified contract. Nowhere 
in the Pre-Trial Order or in the other pleadings do the 
defendants contend that the amended agreement was only 
temporary and that the parties could later revert back to 
the first agreement. 
The evidence in this case further showed that after 
the Burtons had been terminated Coombs leased all of the 
assets of Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc. to Four Seasons Motor 
Inn II, Inc. (Exhibit P-8,PC-19) for a period of thirty 
years. At trial Coombs offered to cancel the lease, claim-
ing the power to do so inasmuch as he owned eighty percent 
of both the lessor and lessee corporations. It is unreason-
able to think that Burtons would have known this. They 
naturally would assume that a formal twenty year lease is 
a twenty year lease. 
The hypocracy of appellants1 evaluation of the facts 
is further demonstrated by their tender of performance made 
shortly before the commencement of the trial (R-150). They 
have continually attempted to make it appear as though Bur-
tons could have returned to their management contract at 
any time, yet even in open court when Burtons attempted to 
accept an offer of re-employment it was immediately refused 
(this point is discussed in detail under Point I of respon-
dents1 cross-appeal). 
-15-
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A recent case that may be of some significance to 
the court is Holley vs. Sullivan, 28 Utah 2d 3, 497 P.2d 
630. In that case, plaintiff was employed by the defen-
dant as a hostess and waitress in a cafe. She was fired 
under the following circumstances as quoted by the court: 
"After a couple of months of seemingly 
harmonious relations, there was a falling out 
over the work of another employee, and the 
plaintiff called the defendant a "dirty 
double-crossing liar", whereupon the defen-
dant said, "young lady, you can go home right 
now". In the next breath, he told her not 
to leave. However, she did leave, saying, 
"You fired me, and now you rehire me in less 
than two seconds, and you're not playing cat 
and mouse with me". 
Under this evidence, the trial judge 
found that the plaintiff was fired; and while 
he may not have ruled as he did, yet we do 
not say that he could not so find." 
The above merely illustrates the type of evidence upon which 
a finding of improper termination may be based. Plaintiffs 
place no special significance on this case, as the facts 
of plaintiff in the instant case are so much stronger than 
Holley that there can be no reasonable comparison. 
Respondents would contend, not only that there is 
sufficient evidence to support the findings of the trial 
court, but that the total evidence clearly preponderates 
in favor of them. It is simply unreasonable to believe 
-16-
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that the Burtons would simply have walked off the job and 
risked losing their entire lifetime savings without being 
ordered to do so. The greater credibility lies with the 
respondents. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT RESPONDENTS BREACHED THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT. 
Point II of appellants1 brief is filled with state-
ments of fact that are disputed. The question of whether 
appellants, or whether the respondents, breached the manage-
ment contract is a factual issue and Burtons1 responsive 
argument as to the factual issues is fully covered under 
Point I of this brief. 
It may again be significant to note, however, that 
appellants' argument under Point II is entirely inconsistent 
with the claims that were made in the trial court. In the 
pleadings in Pre-Trial Order (R-140) it has always been the 
position of appellants that the original management contract 
was modified by a subsequent oral agreement and that the 
Burtons breached the new agreement (not the old), by refus-
ing to manage the combined operation of the two motels. 
Now that the trial court has made findings that no new 
agreement was ever made between the parties (R-284), the 
-17-
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appellants make an about face and claim that it was the 
original contract that was breached by the Burtons. This 
is but a typical example of how the appellants have con-
tinually vacillated their position, to fit the expediency 
of the moment, and have kept the Burtons in a continual 
state of frustration. It is little wonder that the trial 
court didnft think much of the appellants1 credibility. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT I 
— , a.. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE DEFEN-
DANTS WERE BOUND BY THEIR PARTIAL SETTLEMENT OFFER WHICH 
WAS ACCEPTED IN OPEN COURT. 
The facts upon which respondents rely for their 
cross-appeal are not included in their statement of facts 
and will therefore be stated herewith. Approximately one 
week before the trial, the defendants tendered an offer to 
the plaintiffs which was put in the form of a formal plead-
ing and filed in the case (R-150). The pleading was entitled 
"Reaffirmation of Tender of Performance" although Burtons 
evidence was to the effect that such an offer had never 
been previously made. Under the terms of the written offer, 
the defendants agreed to the following: 
(a) To reinstate the plaintiffs in their manage-
ment contract. 
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(b) To change the name of the convention center 
and motel operated across the street by 
Four Seasons Motor Inn II, Inc. 
(c) To perform whatever acts are required to 
sever the two motels and allow the plaintiffs 
to properly perform under their management 
contract. 
(d) To permit all parties to continue to pursue 
without prejudice any claims against the 
other to the date of acceptance of the tender. 
During the course of the trial counsel for the defendants 
on three occasions made reference to the offer and made 
representations to the court that it was available for 
acceptance by the plaintiffs even during the trial (unfor-
tunately the oral arguments of counsel in making these rep-
resentations were not reported, (T-3,26,141). Burtons had 
not responded to the offer and had proceeded through trial 
on a theory of anticipatory breach. That is, they claimed 
that they were entitled to damages over the full unexpired 
period of the management contract. Plaintiffs proof of 
damages was to this effect. They called an expert witness 
Dr. Boyd Fjeldsted, a consulting research economist from 
the University of Utah Economic Business and Research Depart-
ment to testify on the subject of damages. Dr. Fjeldsted 
made a very scholarly study and concluded that after taking 
into consideration the projected future receipts of the motel, 
-19-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the value of the furnished apartment to the managers, 
reductions for present worth, and additional reductions 
for age based upon motel industry statistics, that the 
total damages to Burtons on an anticipatory breach theory 
was $237,760.00 (See T-112-134). 
After plaintiffs had rested their case, the 
court met with counsel in chambers. He did not make 
any rulings, nor did he tell counsel how he was going 
to rule, but suggested that the parties ought to get the 
case settled. In following the suggestion of the court, 
plaintiffs decided to accept defendants1 offer. They 
thereupon re-entered the courtroom and made the follow-
ing statement on the record (T-141): 
"Now, then, the court will recall Civil 
No. 4940. Counsel are present as is the 
parties, are you ready to proceed? 
Mr. West: Yes, your Honor. I have a 
matter which I would like to present at this 
time to the Court. Following our discussion 
in chambers with the Court we have met with 
counsel and discussed this matter with our 
clients and at this time, your Honor, we would 
like to refer to the Court the formal tender 
of performance which is in the file, dated 
October the 3rd of 1974, it would have been 
filed last week, and at that time the defen-
dants in this case made a tender of performance 
where, and I might just review this, 
(The document was then read in its entirety 
into the record) 
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At this time, your Honor, the defendants or 
the plaintiffs in this case make an unconditional 
acceptance of this tender that has been proposed 
and that counsel has represented throughout the 
trial. We will go back and resume the manage-
ment, so it would be our position at this time, 
then, that this is without prejudice as far as 
any other claims that we might have, and so the 
only issue, as I see it, at this point, would be 
the damages in the interim period, what they are 
and if in fact we are entitled to damages during 
that period." 
Mr. Lybbert then immediately repudiated the offer after which 
the following additional record was made: 
"The Court: Well, the Court is advised of 
the statement by Mr. West in behalf of the plain-
tiffs in this case, they accept unconditionally in 
form and content your reaffirmation of tender of 
performance filed in this case and I take it at the 
time that you would like to withdraw that; on the 
other hand, it is under advisement and the Court 
is advised of your position at this juncture in 
the lawsuit, Mr. West. And so the record is clear, 
the Court, and the record should show that the Court 
did in fact call counsel into chambers and off the 
record and in an effort to encourage the parties 
in this case to settle their differences if they 
could at this juncture in the lawsuit, at least 
indicated some of the views of the Court on some 
of the issues and state of the proof. However, Mr. 
West and Mr. Lybbert, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Poelman, 
you all agree with the Court that the Court advised 
you, don't misinterpret the statements of the Court, 
the Court didn't intend that to be any ruling but 
just to assist you, if it could, in reaching some 
settlement among yourselves, and that is correct, 
isn't it, Mr. West? 
Mr. West: Yes, your Honor, I understand. I 
don't make any claim that the Court made any ruling 
in Chambers or that the Court indicated how the 
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Court would rule on the issues, and as far as 
our acceptance of this tender is concerned it's 
been represented right in this courtroom not 
once but on at least three occasions that I can 
remember by Mr* Lybbert himself that that offer 
is outstanding, it is still outstanding, it 
remains outstanding throughout the course of 
this trial and it has never been—I would rep-
resent to the Court that it's never been revoked 
and that our acceptance is an unconditional 
acceptance." 
By making an unconditional acceptance of defendantsf offer 
plaintiffs gave up their claim for damages under the antic-
ipatory breach theory. The terms of the written offer pro-
vided that it was without prejudice as to any existing claims 
up to the date of acceptance, and the balance of the case 
was devoted to resolving the factual issues of who breached 
the management contract, and the amount of plaintiffs' dam-
ages during the interim period to the date of reinstatement 
under the offer. 
It is also significant that the court at the con-
clusion of this case made a statement to the effect that he 
thought defendants were bound by their tender offer (I-193). 
However, when the judge made his final ruling he ruled in 
favor of the Burtons on the breach of contract issue and 
concluded "that no good purpose would be served by ruling 
as a matter of law, that the acceptance of the offer is 
binding on any party, and hence rules that it is not binding" 
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(T-286; see also separate transcript of court proceedings, 
pages 13,14). Obviously, the trial judge felt in light 
of his findings and judgment that a ruling on the accept-
ance of the offer made no difference. But the fact is 
that it made a very important difference. That is, that 
the part of the offer relating to a change of name by 
the second motel is left unresolved. This point is of 
extreme importance to the Burtons. Under the ruling of 
the court the Burtons have gone back and resumed the 
management of the original motel. While, of course, there 
is no evidence before this court as to what has happened 
since the judgment, it takes little imagination to realize 
the confusion and problems that would exist where two 
motels with separate ownership across the street from 
each other in the same town attempt to operate under the 
same name. Burtons gave up a very valuable right when they 
accepted defendants1 offer in open court. They gave up 
the right to pursue any additional claim for anticipatory 
breach. They are now entitled to the full benefits of 
the contract that came into being, which includes the 
changing of the name of their competing corporation. 
At no time prior to acceptance was defendantsf offer 
ever revoked, nor was there ever any intervening counteroffers. 
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Burtons1 position is that under the most elementary con-
tract principles of offer and acceptance, both parties 
are bound by the contract that was formed. If the posi-
tion of the parties were reversed, it is inconceivable 
to think that plaintiffs could have revoked the contract 
and continued to seek damages for anticipatory breach 
after having made an unconditional acceptance in open 
court; likewise defendants must be bound by the terms 
of their own proposal. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED BY AWARDING PLAINTIFFS INSUFFICIENT 
DAMAGES. 
A. Plaintiffs' Measure of Damages in This Case. 
Having found that the defendants breached the management 
contract and that the Burtons were justified in not return-
ing to work until after the issues in this case were resolved, 
it became the duty of the trial court to determine and award 
damages. In this case the trial court arbitrarily awarded 
plaintiffs the sum of $1,000.00 per month from the date of 
breach until the date of the court's decision (R-285,287,289). 
Burtons contend that the figure of $1,000.00 is not supported 
by the evidence. 
Ordinarily the measure of damages for the breach of 
an employment contract by the employer is the amount that 
the discharged employee would have received or would have 
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earned had the contract been performed. 22 Am. Jur. 2d 
Damages, Section 70, Russell -vs- Ogden Utah Ryf 122 Utah 
107, 247 P.2d 257. 
In this case, the rate of compensation to the 
employee managers is tied to gross receipts from the motel 
operation. Thus, it is impossible to determine with exact 
precision what the damages are. Under such circumstances, 
the principles set forth in the case of Gould -vs- Mountain 
States Telephone Company, 6 Utah 2d 187, 309 P.2d 802 be-
come very important. That case involved a suit for damages 
against the telephone company by an attorney for failure to 
include his name in the telephone directory. The argument 
of the defendant was that the cause of action should fail 
because of the impossibility of determining damages. In 
rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court held as follows: 
"Where the plaintiff has shown actual loss 
of business during the period as a result of 
defendant's breach of contract, he will not 
be denied recovery because the exact amount 
of damages cannot be readily ascertained. To 
this effect is the rule laid down by this 
court that where the fact of substantial 
damages shown, the court or jury cannot award 
nominal damages only on the ground that the 
amount of substantial damage has not been 
shown with reasonable certainty. 
The rule against recovery of uncertain 
damages is generally directed against uncertainty 
with respect to cause rather than to measure or 
extent, so that a party who has broken his con-
tract will not ordinarily be permitted to 
escape liability because of uncertainty in 
amount of damage resulting, and the fact that 
the full extent of damages for breach of 
contract must be a matter of speculation is 
not a around for refusina all damaaes." 
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Justice Crockett concurred specially in favor of allowing 
damages and stated as follows: 
"I am also in accord with the idea expressed 
in the main opinion, that where substantial 
damages shown to have resulted from the breach 
of a duty, the fact that the injured person 
may have difficulty in proving the amount of 
his damage should not resound to the benefit 
of the wrongdoer. Rather than conferring an 
advantage upon him, doubt should be resolved 
in favor of compensating the injured person 
for his injury. We can see no objection to 
placing before the jury all of the facts and 
circumstances of the case having any tendency 
to show damages so as to enable them to make the 
most intelligible and probable estimate which 
the nature of the case will admit." 
With the above principle in mind, we can examine the evi-
dence in the instant case. According to the evidence of 
Newel Jackson (the accountant) taken by deposition (T-lll), 
the gross receipts for the first year of operation of Four 
Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., was $138,000.00. This did not 
include the month of April, 1973, which would have been 
the last month of the fiscal year. Mrs. Burton testified 
that the gross receipts for April attributable to the forty 
unit motel only was in excess of $20,000.00 (T-18). Also, 
the testimony was that in May of 1972, being the first month 
of operation, that the motel opened on May 6 with only 5 
or 6 units ready for occupancy and that all of the units 
were not completed until Decoration Day (T-15). If the 
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motel had been open throughout the entire month of May, 
1972, it conservatively would have produced at least 
another $10,000.00 of revenue. Thus, the income for the 
first year's operation was $169,000.00 calculated as 
follows: 
Gross receipts as shown on 
books of corporation $138,000.00 
Additional receipts for April, 1973 . . 21,000.00 
Estimate of additional receipts 
for May, 1972, if the motel had 
been completed 10,000.00 
TOTAL $169,000.00 
The above is close to Coombs projection which was made prior 
to construction that the revenue would be $163,520.00 
(Exhibit P-4). 
It is reasonable to assume that the motel would 
have done better in its second year of operation. Partic-
ularly is this true in light of Mrs. Burtonfs testimony that 
the repeat business was building up substantially (T-18), 
and in light of Mr. Coombs' testimony that there were two 
increases in room rental rates after the first year (T-116,117). 
Based upon the above evidence, plaintiffs contend 
that the receipts for the second year had the Burtons been 
permitted to continue with their contract would have been 
at least $180,000.00. Ten percent (10%) of that amount 
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would equal $18,000.00 or $1,500.00 per month. It is 
undisputed that the last month for which the Burtons 
were paid was April, 1973, and that nothing has been 
paid since that time. All of the damage evidence was 
virtually undisputed. Thus, the court should have award-
ed plaintiffs damages based upon $1,500.00 per month and 
not $1,000.00 per month. 
B. Under the Facts of this Case, No Mitigation 
Factors Should be Considered by the Court. In its find-
ings the court made the statement that in awarding damages 
it had taken into consideration all matters of mitigation. 
It is Burtons1 position that it would have been improper 
in this case to consider any mitigating circumstances. The 
authorities are generally in agreement that the breaching 
employer has the burden of proof to establish that substan-
tially similar employment opportunities were available in 
the same locality and that the employee cannot be compelled 
to take a different type job or a job in a different area. 
Crillo -vs- Curtola, (Cal.) 204 P.2d 941; Farrell -vs- School 
District, 98 Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053. No such evidence was 
offered by the defendants in this case, and they have failed 
in meeting their burden of proof. 
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Aside from the above, however, there is an even 
more compelling reason why it would be improper to con-
sider any mitigation in this case. The leading case upon 
which plaintiffs rely is Chioda -vs- General Waterworks 
Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 425, 413 P.2d 891. In that case, 
plaintiff was the owner of the Bear River Telephone Com-
pany in Northern Utah. He sold all of his corporate 
stock to the defendant, and, in connection with the sale 
of the business retained a ten year employment contract. 
After the sale was made, the plaintiff worked for a short 
period and was discharged. The grounds for the discharge 
were claimed dishonesty, disloyalty and insubordination 
of the employee. The plaintiff thereupon filed suit to 
recover his compensation under the employment contract. 
The court found that there had not been sufficient justif-
ication for the discharge and awarded plaintiff judgment 
for the full balance that he would have earned had the 
contract been performed. One of the issues on appeal was 
whether the trial court should have required mitigation of 
future damages. On that issue, the court held as follows: 
"There are two reasons why the trial court 
was justifiably not impressed with the defen-
dant's insistence upon mitigation of damages. 
First, as the deal was worked out, the payment 
of this salary for ten (10) years, could well 
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be regarded as a deferred payment of part of 
the overall consideration plaintiff required 
for his telephone company. Second, inasmuch 
as the plaintiff is 60 years old, it would 
be unrealistic to conjecture as to his ability 
or desire to get another position and earn 
money for the purpose of mitigating defendant's 
damages." 
In other words, since the employment contract was part of 
the consideration for the sale of the business, the court 
in Chioda did not consider the employment contract in the 
usual sense. The very same considerations apply to the 
instant case. We are dealing with a management contract 
that was purchased. The Burtons paid $80,000.00 to acquire 
it. We are not dealing with a typical contract where the 
services to be performed are the consideration for the 
contract. Here, a very substantial part of the consider-
ation was the payment of money. It is totally unreasonable 
to believe that Coombs would have offered a thirty year con-
tract with compensation at the rate of ten percent of gross 
revenues to anyone, regardless of their capabilities, in 
the absence of the $80,000.00 investment. If the reasoning 
of Chioda is followed by the court, it is clear that no 
mitigation factor should be applied. 
C. Effect of Offers of Re-employment. Although 
the trial court did not appear to have reduced plaintiffs' 
damages because of defendants alleged and fictitious offers 
-70-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of employment, respondents in answer to Point III of 
appellants' brief feel that perhaps some comment should 
be made on this point. Plaintiffs acknowledge that under 
certain circumstances, an employee may be under a duty 
to accept an offer of re-employment if it is a bona fide 
offer and made in good faith. Defendants1 formal offer 
which they tendered in court was designated as a "reaffir-
mation" of tender of performance. As a part of their 
evidence, they offered a letter dated April 2, 1974 (after 
the date of the Pre-trial herein) upon which they apparently 
rely in establishing the prior offer (Exhibit D-10). The 
implication would be that plaintiffs should be precluded 
from recovering damages after April of 1974. 
In order for an offer of re-employment to have any 
effect whatsoever, it must be made in good faith and it 
must be totally unconditional in that the employee must 
not be required to suffer any loss or give up any rights by 
accepting it. Larsen -vs- Fisher, 48 N.W. 2d 502. The 
letter of April 2 is obviously a conditional offer in that 
it compels the plaintiff to recognize a modified agreement 
that plaintiffs claim did not exist. It, further, does 
not preserve the existing claims of the Burtons. Also, the 
claimed offer was rather empty in that it recites that 
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Burtons should resume the duties of management bur pro-
vides for no practical way in which the duties can be 
performed. Further, no resumption of salary was ever 
extended. 
A case involving the good faith of an offer of 
re-employment is Grey -vs- Pacific Section Cleaner Company, 
155 Pac. 469. This case involved the question of whether 
the employee was ever in good faith given the opportunity 
to resume his duties. Again, there was an employment con-
tract for a definite period. When the plaintiff did not 
receive his monthly paycheck, he sued for his back wages 
and was immediately fired. Two days later, he began an 
action for wrongful discharge. The offer of re-employment 
that the defendant relied on in mitigation of damages was 
made through a series of five letters. The plaintiff refused 
the offer of re-employment because he felt it was made in 
bad faith. The court made some interesting observations 
on what constitutes a good faith offer: 
"It is to be observed that all of this 
occurred after the action was begun. The 
contents of the letters of the defendant in-
dicate that they were prepared either by the 
attorneys for the defendant or under their 
direction. The correspondence and the circum-
stances shown in the evidence justify the 
inference that the defendant was much more 
desirous of laying a foundation for mitigation 
of damages in the suit than of taking the 
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plaintiff back into its service. The motive 
is, of course, apparent. A reasonable per-
son would easily perceive that the continuance 
of Grey in the service of the company after 
the occurrences leading up to the beginning 
of the action would most probably be disagree-
able and undesirable to both parties, and would 
necessarily cause friction between them. With-
out further discussion, we think it's sufficient 
to say that upon all the evidence the court was 
justified in drawing the conclusion that the 
offer was made in bad faith, and that the finding 
to that effect is supported by the evidence." 
The court also observed that the apparent ambiguity in the 
offer of re-employment as to payment of costs of plaintiff 
for legal action taken was another circumstance tending to 
show bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. 
Approximately one week before the trial date, the 
defendants made the first unqualified offer of re-employment 
to the plaintiff. It is obvious that this document was pre-
pared by defendants' attorney for the sole purpose of miti-
gating damages and was not a good faith offer. This is 
apparent by the defendants' attempt to withdraw the offer 
after the plaintiff accepted the same. This course of 
action on the part of the defendants confirmed plaintiffs 
continuing concern that the offer was not made in good faith. 
Another case concerning good faith offers of re-
employment is Dahl -vs- the SS Amigo, 202 F. Supp. 890. 
This case involved an action by two seamen for breach of 
contract of employment and some other relief relating to 
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maritime law not applicable here. However, the breach 
for contract of employment is applicable in that the 
court relies on the common law in formulating its deci-
sion. These officers were employed for one year and dis-
charged without cause after three months. Only after the 
plaintiffs obtained counsel did the defendant offer them 
re-employment. The court held as follows: 
"It is established law that upon the breach 
of the contract of employment, the employee 
must endeavor to mitigate his damages by seeking 
other employment; and if a bona fide offer of 
re-employment is made by the same employer, it 
must be accepted in mitigation of damages. An 
offer of re-employment must be a genuinely sin-
cere and bona fide offer, made in good faith, 
to be considered in mitigation. Whitmarsh v. 
Littlefield, 46 Hun 418, 11 N.Y.S. 815. if 
there are reasonable grounds for rejection of 
an offer of re-employment, the discharged 
employee is under no obligation to accept 
re-employment. Levin v. Standard Fashion Com-
pany, 16 Daly 404, 11 N.Y.S. 706. If anything 
has occurred that would render further assoc-
iation between the parties offensive, then in 
that event, the employee is not obligated to 
accept the offer or re-employment. Levin v. 
Standard Fashion Company, supra; Birdsong v. 
Ellis, 62 Miss. 418; Connell v. Averill, 8 App. 
Div. 524, 40 N.Y.S. 855. The court is not 
convinced that there was a sincere bona fide 
offer of re-employment. However, if the offer 
of re-employment was such, the court is of the 
opinion that the existing circumstances (that 
is the wrongful discharge, the living condi-
tions that prevail aboard the vessel, the fact 
that there was no unconditional tender of wages 
along with the offer of re-employment, the ill 
feeling that had been engendered, and the fact 
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that libelants had engaged the services of 
attorneys) constituted reasonable grounds 
for the libelants' rejection of the offer of 
re-employment." 
All five of these elements are present in the case before 
the court. 
The case of Price -vs- Davis, 173 S.W. 64, stands 
for the proposition that ill will can be an insuperable 
barrier between the parties justifying not accepting an 
offer of re-employment. The court held as follows: 
"In the quarrel between the parties which 
preceded the discharge, things were said and 
done which tended to place an insuperable 
barrier between them and to make their further 
association in business unprofitable and de-
grading to the plaintiff. 
The rule in such cases, as stated in Bird-
song v. Ellis, supra, is that: 'If anything had 
occurred to render further association between 
the parties offensive or degrading, or if the 
plaintiff had engaged in any other employment 
incompatible with his return to the defendant, 
he might reject the offer with safety and 
without suffering diminution of his damages on 
the ground that it was an offer he should have 
accepted'." 
If the wrong of the employer in discharging 
the employee is of such character that the parties 
could not be restored to their former relation-
ship, then an offer of re-employment should not 
be construed as imposing upon the employee any 
obligation to accept it, and his refusal to 
accept such offer should not subject him to the 
penalty of the diminution of the damages caused 
by his wrongful discharge." 
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As mentioned previously, the only unconditional 
offer of re-employment made by the defendants was made one 
week before trial under circumstances that were apparently 
more concerned with mitigating damages than with actually 
renewing the business relationship of the parties. The 
authorities cited show that plaintiffs were justified in 
not accepting defendants1 offer until the time they did so. 
Under the circumstances of this case, plaintiffs were 
clearly entitled to interim damages at the rate of $1,500.00 
per month as calculated under Point IIA of Respondents 
Cross-Appeal. 
D. Damages in the Event Respondents Fail Under Point 
I of Their Cross-Appeal. In the event the trial court is 
upheld in its determination that defendants are not bound 
by their offer in open court which was unconditionally 
accepted by the respondents (see Point I of this Cross-
Appeal) then in such event plaintiffs are likewise not 
bound and would be entitled to revert to their original 
claim of total and anticipatory breach. In Restatement of 
Agency 2d, Section 432, Comment B, it is stated as follows: 
"A breach of duty by the principal may 
be partial or total; a partial breach may 
or may not be material. If the breach is 
not material the agent has no privilege to 
refuse to continue but can maintain an 
action for the breach; if it is material, 
but not total, the agent can refuse to con-
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tinue until the breach is cured, a mater-
ial breach may become total. If the breach 
is total, the agent can elect to terminate 
his obligations under the contract and main-
tain an action for the entire amount due 
under the contract, or he can offer to con-
tinue, maintaining action for the amount due 
at the time of the breach. . ." 
Revocation of the offer of re-employment by the defendants 
herein would be an acknowledgment on their part that plain-
tiffs will not be permitted to perform their contract in 
the future and would constitute a total breach. In this 
event, the testimony of plaintiffs1 expert witness on 
damages would become of critical importance. Dr. Fjeldsted 
testified that the total damages, including the reasonable 
value for the loss of the apartment in future years, was 
$237,760.00. This figure is on the ultra conservative 
side. It assumes gross receipts for the base year of 
$169,000.00 which is the figure projected by Coombs and 
is substantially less than the actual first yearfs opera-
tions. It assumes a discount factor for present worth of 
7.25 percent. It considers a reduction for age factors 
based upon professional studies. It assumes a cost of 
living increase of only 2.25 percent, and it is projected 
only until age 75 and allows nothing for the last ten years 
of the contract. If the court permits defendants1 offer 
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to remain revoked plaintiffs would be entitled to an immed-
iate judgment of $237,760.00. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all the arguments and authorities as 
cited herein, respondents respectfully urge the court as 
follows: 
1. To affirm the factual determinations of the 
trial court regarding the breach of contract issues. 
2. To modify the judgment of the lower court by 
determining that appellants are bound by all of the provi-
sions of their written offer which was accepted by plain-
tiffs in open court. 
3. To modify the amount of damages awarded plaintiff 
by increasing the award from $1,000.00 per month to $1,500.00 
per month to conform with the evidence. 
4. In the alternative, to award plaintiffs total 
damages of $237,760.00 as established by the evidence. 
5. To award plaintiffs costs and reasonable attor-
ney^ fees for this appeal (the management contract provides 
for attorney's fees to the prevailing party, and the award 
of attorney's fees included in the judgment only covered 
the services rendered through the date of trial). 
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